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Abstract: 
In this paper, I test for discrimination against the religiously observant in the Israeli rental 
housing market. I perform a correspondence study where half of the requests have a religious 
signal (‘basad’ written at the top of the request), while the other half do not. Because the requests 
are identical otherwise, differences in call-back rates represent the causal effect of writing 
‘basad’ at the top of the request. I find that requests with a religious signal receive 12 percent 
less responses than requests with no such signal, with this differential being greater in cities with 
more left-leaning voters and when the contact person is female. For comparison, requests 
signaling individuals from the Former Soviet Union receive about the same percentage of call-
backs as religious requests, while requests signaling an Arab individual receive significantly 
fewer call-backs than the other groups. 
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Introduction 
Housing discrimination can prevent access to high-quality employment opportunities, health care, 
school quality, and public spaces. In this paper, I test whether there is discrimination towards the 
religiously observant within the same religion and ethnicity in the Israeli rental housing market. To test 
for this kind of discrimination, I send fictitious email requests to view an apartment that is available for 
rent. Half of the requests have no religious signal, while the other half do, and all requests are signaled as 
being from Jewish individuals, thereby isolating the religious signal as the only difference between the 
two requests. Although there are numerous articles on discrimination in the rental housing market in other 
countries with regards to race, ethnicity, type of religion, and sexual orientation, to my knowledge 
discrimination based on degree of religiosity within the same religion and ethnicity has not yet been 
investigated. As such, this paper adds an additional dimension to the discussion on housing market 
discrimination. 
In Israel, friction between the religious and non-religious is apparent in several contexts. There 
are disagreements regarding the timing of school holidays (Chai and Nachshoni, 2017), if businesses can 
operate during the Sabbath (Morag, 2014), and whether works on public projects can be performed during 
the Sabbath (Heller, 2016). This is all part of the constant debate in Israel regarding the separation of 
religion and state (Pew Research Center, 2016). The schism between the religious and non-religious was 
viewed by Israelis to pose more of an internal threat to Israel than ethnic differences between Mizrahi and 
Ashkenazi Jews, differences between the political left and political right, and the growing gap between 
the rich and poor (Zemach, 2010).1 Differences in views between the religious and non-religious have led 
to different laws depending on the religious nature of a city. For instance, the opening of businesses on 
the Sabbath is allowed or tolerated in some cities in Israel, but not in others. This friction in views 
between the religious and non-religious is not particular to Israel and can be seen in other countries, 
                                                          
1 The only dissension above the one between the religious and non-religious was the one between Jews and Arabs.  
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particularly regarding support for abortion and equal rights for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) community.  
Discrimination against the religiously observant in the housing market has not been tested, 
although other factors have been thoroughly investigated, plausibly because it is difficult to isolate 
religious observance from other factors that may affect a landlord’s decision regarding a potential tenant. 
In the labor market, for example, religious affiliation is commonly signaled through membership to a 
volunteer group that is associated with a particular religion, which is not something that is present in short 
written requests to see apartments for rent. To signal religiosity, I use the fact that religiously observant 
Jews in Israel often write ‘basad’ (‘god-willing’ in Aramaic) at the top of written correspondence. 
Therefore, half of the requests I sent regarding an available apartment had ‘basad’ written at the top, 
while the other half did not. This type of correspondence study is a popular way to test for discrimination 
in the labor and housing markets because the experimenter can hold all applicant characteristics constant, 
and only vary the attribute that s/he is testing for discrimination against (Riach and Rich, 2002). 
Overall, I find that requests signaled as religious receive 12 percent less responses than those that 
were not, with non-religious and religious requests receiving a response 53.2 and 46.6 percent of the time, 
respectively. This overall difference is driven by greater differences among the response rates in cities 
with a greater percentage of left-leaning voters (58.5 percent and 48.4 percent response for non-religious 
and religious requests, respectively) and for apartments in which the contact person is female (57.2 
percent and 47.7 percent response for non-religious and religious requests, respectively). To put these 
differences into context, I also sent requests with a name indicative of an individual from the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) and an Arab-Muslim (Arab) sounding name.2 I find that the requests with an FSU 
name receive similar response rates as religious requests, while those requests with an Arab-sounding 
name receive significantly less responses than all other groups.  
                                                          
2 Beginning in 1989, with the lifting of immigration restrictions, there was a large wave of immigration from the 
Soviet Union to Israel.  
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 This paper highlights an additional factor – religious observance – that could lead to 
discrimination in housing markets. This discrimination represents an extra cost to the religious as they 
may be denied housing opportunities that align with their preferences. Those cities in which there were 
statistically and economically significant differences in response rates are also generally those cities with 
high quality schooling (Ministry of Education, 2017) and higher paying jobs in the service industry, rather 
than the manufacturing sector (Barkat, 2016). In Israel, because anti-discrimination laws for private 
housing do not exist (although they have been proposed), this work underscores the need to implement 
such protections, not only regarding ethnic discrimination which has already been found in other 
countries, but also regarding religious observance.  
 
Relevant Literature 
Discrimination in the housing market is typically associated with two economic theories, taste-
based discrimination and statistical discrimination. With taste discrimination (Becker, 1957), the 
discriminator is willing to pay more to avoid association with a particular group. In the framework of 
potential tenants, a discriminating landlord will not reply to requests from a group that s/he has animus 
towards, even if the requests are of equal quality to other requests. That is, s/he is willing to limit the pool 
of candidates to maintain his/her animus. Limiting the pool of candidates imposes extra search costs on 
the landlord, or forces the landlord to settle for lower quality (e.g. lower income) tenants that are from the 
group s/he does not discriminate against.  
With statistical discrimination, the discriminator has incomplete information about potential 
tenants and therefore uses group averages to gain more information about them (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 
1973). Therefore, differential behavior towards potential tenants from different groups is not driven by 
prejudice towards a group, but rather by profit-maximizing behavior. From a landlord’s point of view, an 
individual from a group with higher mean incomes will, on average, have a higher income than an 
individual from a group with lower mean incomes. In this case, even if there is no taste-based 
discrimination against religious individuals, they may receive less call-backs due to statistical 
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discrimination as non-religious Jewish Israeli females and males earn 18 percent and 17 percent more 
than religious Jewish Israeli females and males, respectively (Taub Center, 2016). An additional reason 
may be that religious families, on average, have more children than non-religious families, with an 
average of 4.22 children for religious Jewish females versus 2.56 children and 2.14 children for “not so 
religious” and secular Jewish females, respectively (Hleihel, 2017). If landlords are worried about wear 
and tear on their apartment, complaints from neighbors regarding noise, or other factors associated with 
larger families, these are more likely, on average, to be issues with larger, religious families.   
As mentioned earlier, discrimination in the housing market based on religious observance alone 
has not been tested. Existing work examines discrimination based on identification with a particular 
religion and religiosity in the labor market. Wallace et al. (2014) and Wright et al. (2013), testing for 
discrimination in the South and Northeast US labor markets, respectively, find that those signaling any 
religious affiliation, or those signaling themselves as atheists, receive less call-backs for job interviews. 
As one of the groups they examine are those who do not have a religious indicator on their resume, they 
have an indication of the effect of religiosity. Weichselbaumer (2016), performing a correspondence 
study in the German labor market, found that applicants with Turkish names wearing headscarves receive 
much fewer call-backs than applicants with Turkish names not wearing headscarves. Valfort (2017) finds 
a religiosity penalty for Muslims, but a religiosity advantage for Christians in the labor market in France. 
That is, religious Muslims receive the least percentage of call-backs, and religious Christians the most. 
 Also related to this work in the sense of examining differentials in economic outcomes between 
Jewish subjects, Chiswick and Huang (2008) examine earnings differentials across degree of religiosity 
among American Jews. Running wage regressions, they find an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
religiosity and earnings after controlling for observable characteristics, including education. Unexplained 
differentials in wage regressions are another way to measure discrimination. They find that the 
moderately religious (Conservative Jews) earn more than the non-religious (Reform Jews), who earn 
more than the very religious (Orthodox Jews). The religious fictitious applicant in this study in Israel 
6 
 
would be most closely associated with the Conservative Jews and the non-religious associated with the 
Reform Jews.  
Complementing the findings of the aforementioned studies that dealt with religiosity in the labor 
market, this paper addresses the housing market, where typically two experimental approaches have been 
used to test for discrimination. The first are audit studies, where real-life applicants are matched on all 
characteristics except the one being studied (e.g. one Black individual and one white individual), coached 
to behave similarly, and sent to seek housing from randomly selected landlords or agencies (see Bertrand 
and Duflo 2016 for a review of the audit procedure). Overall, these studies have found discrimination 
against Blacks and Hispanics in the US and also against ethnic minorities in Europe (see Oh and Yinger 
2015 for a review).  
The other type of experimental studies are correspondence studies, which is the type of procedure 
I use in this paper. Using this approach, existing literature has found discrimination with respect to factors 
other than religiosity, including sexual orientation, type of religion (Muslims vs. non-Muslims), ethnicity, 
family status, and employment status. For instance, testing for discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2009) find that homosexual males get discriminated against in terms of 
number of call-backs and showings, and Ahmed et al. (2008) find no evidence of discrimination against 
lesbians in the Swedish housing market.  
Most studies on discrimination in the housing market have examined ethnicity, which can also 
signal religion. For example, people with Arab-sounding names in Europe and the US. In Europe, Ahmed 
and Hammarstedt (2008) find that Arab males receive fewer call-backs than Swedish males and that 
males overall receive fewer call-backs than females. Also in Sweden, Carlsson and Eriksson (2014) find 
that landlords avoid ethnic minorities and the unemployed. Bosch et al. (2010) find discrimination against 
Moroccans in the Spanish rental housing market. When more information is provided to differentiate 
between high-quality and low-quality applicants, some of the discrimination goes away. Baldini and 
Federici (2011) find discrimination against those with Arab names and those with Eastern European 
names in Italy, and Acolin et al. (2016) find discrimination in France against some applicants with non-
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French-sounding names (e.g. from Turkey, North African countries, and Sub-Sahara African countries), 
while no differential responses regarding those with Eastern or Southern European ancestry. Auspurg et 
al. (2017) find discrimination against Turkish applicants versus native applicants in Germany, which 
decreased if the individuals had high-status occupations.  
In Los Angeles county, California, in the US, Carpusor and Loges (2006) find that White-
sounding applicants receive the most responses, followed by applicants with Arab names, followed by 
those signaled by their name to be African-American. Also in the US, Hanson and Hawley (2011) find 
discrimination against African-Americans that is greater when there is a signal that both white and 
African-American candidates are of lower quality, and Ewens et al. (2014) find statistical discrimination 
to be the main source of discrimination against African Americans in their study of 34 US cities.  
Examining rental contract data, Beatty and Sommervoll (2012) find that non-Norwegians pay 
more for comparable apartments than native Norwegians. In Vancouver, Canada, Lauster and Easterbrook 
(2011) find that both female and male single parents and gay male couples are less likely to get call-backs 
than heterosexual couples, while same-sex female couples get similar positive responses to heterosexual 
couples. 
As a whole, these articles point to different levels of discrimination for various groups in society, 
representing a barrier for these groups to high quality employment, health services and schooling. 
However, none of these studies hold ethnicity constant while varying only the level of religiosity, thus 
isolating possible discrimination based on religious observance, which may also lead to unequal treatment 
in the housing market.  
 
Experiment 
The experiment was performed by applying to apartments through Israel’s largest housing search 
internet site (yad2.co.il). Short email messages, with and without a religious signal and with alternating 
names, were sent to ads between 8:30am and 11am on weekdays (Sunday through Thursday in Israel). To 
not reveal the experiment, each apartment for rent was only applied to once, either with or without the 
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signal for religiosity. The disadvantage to this approach is that I am unable to measure whether the same 
landlord responded to one type of request and not the other. On the other hand, an identical request was 
sent, so there are no concerns about the content of the religious and non-religious requests not being 
identical in quality, nor is there a chance of the experiment being compromised.  
To avoid selection bias, every other ad listed on the website was applied to when sending each 
type of request. In addition, only ads that had been active in the past two days were applied to as earlier 
ads may not still be relevant. 3 All relevant information in the ad was recorded, including the price per 
month, number of rooms, name of contact person, and floor. Overall, 1,818 ads were applied to, 909 with 
each type of signal.     
 
The two types of requests to see an apartment were: 
1) Hello, I am interested in the apartment. When is a good time to come see it? 
Moshe Sasson or Yossi Biton 
  
2) ‘Basad’  
Hello, I am interested in the apartment. When is a good time to come see it? 
Moshe Sasson or Yossi Biton 
 
Because the two requests were identical in every respect except the word ‘basad’ at the beginning of 
the message, I interpret differential response rates as the causal effect of writing ‘basad’ on the probability 
of receiving a response.  
                                                          
3 After individuals post rental openings, they can go in every four hours to “jump” the ad to the top of the list. When 
an ad is jumped to the top of the list, the date on the ad is updated. Only ads that had been “jumped” the same day or 
the day before were applied to.   
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‘Moshe’ and ‘Yossi’ are common first names to Jewish Israelis and ‘Sasson’ and ‘Biton’ are 
common last names indicative of a Mizrahi/Sephardi Jew.4 A last name common to Mizrahi Jews was 
included to avoid religiosity signaling ethnicity as there is evidence in Israel that Mizrahi Jews are more 
religious than Ashkenazi Jews (Pew Research Center, 2016). Since Ashkenazi Jews have, on average, 
higher incomes than Mizrahi Jews (Haberfeld and Cohen, 2007), differential call-back rates may be due 
to perceived ethnic differences signaling income differences, rather than perceived differences in 
religiosity. Last names have been used to signal Jewish ethnicity in other studies, including Rubinstein 
and Brenner (2014) and Sansani (2017).  
Literally, ‘basad’ means god-willing in Aramaic.5 From a survey of 105 students performed for a 
different study, there is a statistically significant difference in religious observance between those who 
write ‘basad’ and those who do not, all in favor of those writing ‘basad’ being more religious. Of those 
who write ‘basad’ at the top of written correspondence, 70% observe the Sabbath and attend Synagogue, 
and 100% eat kosher. Of those who do not write ‘basad’, 7.5% observe the Sabbath, 35.5% attend 
Synagogue, and 51.6% eat kosher. Although the degree of religiosity of someone who writes ‘basad’ is 
unclear, someone who writes ‘basad’ is religious to some degree.6   
The correspondence experimental method, like the one used in this study, has several advantages 
for testing for discrimination. Two key advantages are the ability to isolate one factor for which the 
researcher is testing for discrimination against, and that a large sample size can be gathered due to the low 
cost per observation. However, there are also several limitations. First, I am only able to test for 
differential treatment at the initial screening period for seeing apartments, and do not know whether there 
                                                          
4 In Israel, there are two major ethnic Jewish groups, Ashkenazi and Mizrahi. Ashkenazi Jews originate from Europe 
and the US and Mizrahi Jews from countries including Algeria, Iraq, Morocco and Yemen. 
5 Whether ‘basad’ should be written or not has been the focus of some controversy in Israel. For instance, in 2015, a 
lecturer at a college in Israel specifically asked the proctor of the final exam to not write ‘basad’ on the chalkboard, 
as is customary during final exams (Seidler, 2015). In 2003, the incoming Minister of the Interior requested that 
‘basad’ not appear at the top of official documents from the Department of the Interior, drawing the ire of religious 
parties (Regev, 2003).    
6 Recently, a smartphone application was introduced that puts the word ‘basad’ at the top of every webpage that a 
user who downloaded the application visits. 
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is more/less discrimination in future stages of the process. For instance, it may be the case that landlords 
are willing to meet with everyone, but are less flexible in terms of bargaining on rent with the group they 
discriminate against. Beatty and Sommervoll (2012) show that certain ethnic groups pay more for equal 
quality apartments compared to natives in Norway. Second, the results only represent average 
differentials in responses when apartments are applied to in a random fashion. However, upon 
experiencing differential treatment, religious individuals may adjust their behavior to increase their 
chances of securing an apartment. Third, about 10% of ads do not have an option of sending email 
requests, so these ads were not applied to.7 Given these limitations, correspondence studies still have been 
used widely to detect discrimination and complement other methods for measuring discrimination. A 
possible avenue for future research is to perform an audit study with religious and non-religious potential 
tenants.8  
 
Methodology 
I first examine the unconditional differences in response rates overall and by certain city 
characteristics. Then, to determine whether there are differential response rates conditional on apartment 
characteristics, I run linear probability models (LPM) of the following form:9 
 
Yic = α + βXic + ρReligiousic + σc + εic 
 
                                                          
7 There are no statistically significant differences in the characteristics of ads with and without the possibility of 
reaching the landlord by email.  
8 Religiosity can also be signaled in several ways in face to face interactions including the hijab in Islam and the 
headscarf and kippah in Judaism.  
9 A linear probability model (LPM) is used for two main reasons. First, interaction effects are not estimated correctly 
in non-linear models (e.g. probit and logit) with standard statistical software commands (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
Second, the main drawback of using LPM is that it may lead to predicted probabilities that are greater than 1 or less 
than 0 and, therefore, biased and inconsistent estimates. However, there are no predicted probabilities that fall 
outside this range. That said, I test for the robustness of the results by estimating probit and logit models as well. I 
use the inteff command in Stata (Norton et al. 2004) to estimate the interaction terms correctly, finding that the 
results are qualitatively the same as the LPM.  
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Where i represents each ad and c the city the apartment is in. Y is equal to 1 if the request received a 
response, and 0 otherwise. Religious is a dummy variable indicating whether ‘basad’ was written at top of 
message and X represents a vector of apartment characteristics, gender of contact person, city 
characteristics, and the name on the request (Yossi Biton or Moshe Sasson). σ represents city fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the city level in all specifications.   
To get a sense of the magnitude of the discrimination against the religious relative to 
discrimination based on other applicant characteristics that have been used in the existing literature, I test 
for discrimination against requests with an Arab name and requests with a typical name of an immigrant 
from the FSU. Arab and FSU individuals make up about 17% and %12  percent of the Israeli population, 
respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Two-hundred requests were sent with an Arab name 
(Ahmed) and 200 requests were sent with a name typical of someone from the FSU (Dimitry). To 
compare the discrimination of the religious to discrimination against other groups, I add the dummy 
variables Arab and FSU, each depicting a request with that type of name, to the regression above and 
estimate the following model:  
 
Yic = α + βXic + ρ1Religiousic + ρ2Arabic + ρ3FSUic + σc + εic 
 
All of the other control variables remain unchanged. 
 
Results 
In Table 1 are the number of apartments applied to in each city and the proportion of requests that 
received a call-back in that city. In each city, I sent an equal number of religious and non-religious 
requests, with the number of requests sent in each city determined by the number of ads in that city that 
are not more than two days old. Overall, 909 requests were sent without a religious signal and 909 with a 
religious signal.  
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Table 1: Number of Requests Sent by City 
 Religious  Non-Religious 
City 
N Prop. of 
call-backs  
N Prop. of 
call-backs 
Tel Aviv 136 0.471  136 0.581 
Ramat Gan/Givatayim 118 0.475  118 0.576 
Jerusalem 98 0.520  98 0.561 
Rishon Lezion 82 0.354  82 0.439 
Herzliya/Ramat HaSharon 70 0.443  70 0.614 
Be'er Sheva 62 0.548  62 0.548 
Holon/Bat-Yam 61 0.492  61 0.361 
Petah Tikva 60 0.267  60 0.467 
Rehovot/Ness Ziona 58 0.500  58 0.483 
Kfar Saba/Raanana 56 0.589  56 0.625 
Haifa 56 0.482  56 0.536 
Netanya 52 0.462  52 0.500 
      
Total 909 0.466   909 0.532 
Notes: Number of requests sent in each city for each category of request. Some 
smaller cities that are adjacent to other cities are grouped together by the website.  
 
Table 2 compares the observable characteristics of apartments applied to with a religious signal 
and those applied to without a religious signal. This is important if the probability of receiving a call-back 
is associated with the characteristics of the apartment. For instance, if landlords of higher priced 
apartments generally respond more than those of lower priced apartments, then if more non-religious 
requests are sent to higher priced apartments, this could bias the results in favor of finding differential 
response rates between the two types of requests. As shown in the table, however, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the characteristics of the apartments to which the two types of requests were sent.  
The unconditional differences in response rates, both overall, and by certain apartment and city 
characteristics, are in table 3. Overall, 46.6% (n = 424) of the religious requests received a response while 
53.2% (n = 484) of the requests with no religious signal received a response. This difference is 
statistically significant, and comes out to one less response for religious requests for every 15 requests 
sent out. When looking at the monthly rent of the apartment, I find that although the overall response rate 
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Table 2: Comparison of Apartment Characteristics 
Apartment Characteristic 
Religious 
Non-
Religious 
Difference 
(std. err.) 
    
Price (1000s of NIS) 4.410 4.445 -0.035 
   (0.057) 
     
Rooms 3.189 3.204 -0.014 
   (0.032) 
     
Floor 2.729 2.733 -0.003 
   (0.120) 
     
Female/Male Contact Person (Male = 1) 0.613 0.633 -0.020 
   (0.023) 
     
Availability (0 = immediately, 1 = future date) 0.403 0.438 -0.035 
      (0.023) 
Notes: Apartment characteristics by type of request sent. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
 
to both religious and non-religious requests is higher with higher-priced apartments, the difference in 
response rate is similar whether the monthly rent of the apartment is below or above the median rent. 
Regarding gender, the difference is greater in magnitude (and statistically significant) when the 
apartment contact person is female versus when the contact person is male. When the contact person is 
female, the difference between the response rate for non-religious and religious requests is 9.5 percentage 
points and when the contact person is male, the difference is 4.2 percentage points. This difference may 
be because males in Israel are generally more religiously observant than females (Pew Research Center, 
2016). Note that there are less observations when comparing females and males since there are gender-
neutral names.  
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Table 3: Comparison of Call-Back Rates by Apartment and City Characteristic 
Category Religious 
Non-
Religious Difference  
(Standard 
error) 
     
Overall (n = 1,818) 0.466 0.532 -0.066*** (0.023) 
     
Below Median Rents (n = 884) 0.411 0.470 -0.059* (0.033) 
Above Median Rents (n = 934) 0.521 0.589 -0.069** (0.032) 
     
Female Contact Person (n = 526) 0.477 0.572 -0.095** (0.044) 
Male Contact Person (n = 894) 0.473 0.516 -0.042 (0.033) 
     
Percent Left-leaning Voters Above Median (n = 902) 0.484 0.585 -0.101*** (0.033) 
Percent Left-leaning Voters Below Median (n = 916) 0.449 0.480 -0.032 (0.033) 
     
Name = Moshe Sasson (n = 909) 0.469 0.527 -0.058* (0.033) 
Name = Yossi Biton (n = 909) 0.464 0.537 -0.074** (0.033) 
Notes: Call-back rates by apartment, city, and applicant characteristics. *** significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%.  
 
The difference in response rates is greatest when examining cities that are more left-leaning.10 In 
cities that are more left-leaning, the difference in responses to non-religious and religious requests is 10.1 
percentage points; in cities that are less left-leaning the difference is 3.2 percentage points. This 
difference is not surprising as political leanings are related to religiosity, with 76 percent of the secular 
Jews identifying as center or left politically, while around 48 percent of the religious (non-Orthodox) 
identify as center or left politically (Pew Research Center, 2016). As expected, the difference in the call-
back rates received by the name used is similar.   
In Table 4 are the results of the LPM model which controls for apartment and city characteristics. 
In the specifications with an indicator for gender there are less observations because some landlords have 
gender-neutral names. In columns 1 through 3 are the results without interaction terms. Without 
interaction terms, the coefficient on Religious is statistically significant and economically meaningful 
with a coefficient between -0.058 and -0.064, indicating that sending in a request with ‘basad’ written at  
                                                          
10 To determine the general political views of voters in a city, I examined how voters in that city voted in the last 
Israeli elections in 2015. I measured the sum of the percentage of voters who voted for the two left-leaning Jewish 
parties (Meretz and Mahane Tsioni).  
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Table 4: Probability of Receiving Call Back 
Dependent Variable: Positive Response to Request to See Apartment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Religious -0.064** -0.064** -0.058* 0.058 0.008 -0.086** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.084) (0.048) (0.032) 
       
Price (1000s of NIS) 0.042** 0.042** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.041** 0.048*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) 
       
Number of Rooms 0.015 0.014 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) 
       
Floor of Apartment -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
       
Entrance date  0.010 0.011 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.002 
(1 = future date; 0 = 
immediately) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
       
Name 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
       
Percentage of left-leaning voters  0.314   0.432*  
  (0.204)   (0.209)  
       
Male   -0.026   -0.049 
   (0.024)   (0.032) 
       
Religious*Price    -0.028   
    (0.018)   
       
Religious*Left-leaning     -0.241*  
     (0.120)  
       
Religious*Male      0.045 
      (0.031) 
       
Observations 1818 1818 1420 1818 1818 1420 
Notes: Linear probability model where dependent variable is equal to 1 if a call-back was received. 
Standard errors clustered on city are in parentheses. All specifications include city fixed effects. *** 
significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
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the top decreases the probability of receiving a response by around 0.06, similar to the unconditional 
differences found in table 3. In addition, a higher rental price leads to a higher probability of receiving a 
call-back. The other apartment characteristics do not have a statistically significant effect on the call-back 
rate.  
In columns 4 through 6 I interact religious with price, a measure of the political leanings of the 
city, and gender. The only statistically significant interaction is with the political leanings of the city. The 
more left a city leans, the less likely a religious request to receive a response. This is expected given the 
large differences in response rates found for left-leaning cities in table 3. The interactions of price and 
male are of the expected sign given the unconditional differences reported in table 3, but the point 
estimates are statistically insignificant.  
In Table 5 I test for the magnitude of the differentials in call-backs that the religious queries 
received by comparing them to other groups who may be discriminated against, Arab and FSU 
individuals. In Panel A are the unconditional differences in call-back rates and in Panel B are different 
specifications of the LPM. First, although the unconditional difference in call-back rates between the non-
religious and religious is 0.066, the difference between the non-religious and FSU individuals is 0.077, 
and the differences between the non-religious and Arab individuals is 0.287. All of these differences are 
statistically significant and in favor of the non-religious. The difference between religious applicants and 
FSU applicants is a non-statistically significant 0.011, and the difference between the religious applicants 
and Arab applicants is a statistically significant 0.221. When controlling for apartment characteristics in 
the LPM model (Panel B), expectedly similar results emerge. FSU individuals receive less call-backs than 
religious individuals, and Arabs receive much fewer call-backs than religious individuals. However, there 
is no statistically significant difference between the call-backs received by FSU signaled requests and 
religious requests. 
The results in Table 5 provide some context for the discrimination, as measured in this paper, 
faced by religious individuals versus those not signaling any religiosity. The magnitude of the differential 
in call-backs for the religious is on roughly the same order as the discrimination faced by FSU  
17 
 
Table 5 
Panel A: Proportion of Requests Receiving a Response 
Non-Religious 0.532  
Non-
Religious 0.532 
FSU 0.455  Arab 0.245 
Difference 0.077**  Difference 0.287*** 
(std. error) (0.039)  (std. error) (0.038) 
     
Religious 0.466  Religious 0.466 
FSU 0.455  Arab 0.245 
Difference 0.011  Difference 0.221*** 
(std. error) (0.039)  (std. error) (0.038) 
     
Panel B: Probability of Receiving Call-Back 
Dep. Var.: Positive Response to Request to See Apartment  
FSU name -0.095*** -0.094** -0.093*** -0.094*** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
     
Arab name -0.258*** -0.256*** -0.255*** -0.256*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
     
Religious -0.064** -0.064** -0.064** -0.064** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
     
Price (1000s of NIS) 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
Number of Rooms  0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
     
Floor of Apartment  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Entrance date   0.015 0.015 
(1 = future date; 0 = immediately)   (0.028) (0.028) 
     
Percentage of left-of-center voters    0.198 
    (0.264) 
     
Observations 2218 2218 2218 2218 
Notes: Linear probability model where dependent variable is equal to 1 if a call-back was received. 
Omitted group is the non-religious. Standard errors clustered on city are in parentheses. All 
specifications include city fixed effects. *** significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
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individuals, but much less than that faced by Arab individuals. The finding of significant inter-religion 
discrimination faced by Arab individuals is similar to that found in other countries, as in the papers 
mentioned above. Although not the focus of this paper, these results highlight the vast discrimination that 
Arab individuals face in the housing market in Israel, in addition to the discrimination they face in other 
market transactions in Israel (e.g., see Zussman 2013; Bar and Zussman 2017).  
 
Conclusion 
Discrimination in the housing market makes it tougher for families belonging to the group that is 
discriminated against to gain access to employment opportunities, health care, school quality, and public 
spaces. Recognizing where and for what characteristics discrimination exists can help policymakers 
address the matter. The aim of this paper is to examine whether religious observance (independent of 
ethnicity) leads to discrimination in the housing market. This is a factor that has not been analyzed 
previously. I isolate the causal effect of religiosity by sending requests that are identical, except that half 
the requests have ‘basad’ written at the top and the other half do not. As such, any difference in call-back 
rates can be attributed to writing ‘basad’, which religious individuals write at the beginning of written 
communication. 
I find that religious requests receive a response 46.6 percent of the time while non-religious 
requests receive a response 53.2 percent of the time. This difference is statistically significant and holds 
when including control variables representing apartment and city characteristics. When including 
interaction terms, I find that the difference in call-backs increases as the percentage of left-leaning voters 
in the city increases. To get a sense of the magnitude of the differential response that religious requests 
receive, I also sent out requests with an Arab sounding name and an FSU-sounding name. I find that 
requests with FSU-sounding names receive less call-backs than religious requests, but this difference is 
statistically insignificant, and requests with Arab names receive much less call-backs than religious 
requests and this difference is statistically significant. As such, although it pales in comparison to the 
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discrimination measured for Arab individuals, religious individuals face an extra cost in their apartment 
search relative to non-religious individuals, at least in the initial stages of the process.  
In Israel, there is currently no law regarding discrimination for private real estate, although there 
are many policy recommendations for such mandates (e.g. Dvir and Tsion, 2016). Studies that find 
discrimination against several different groups, such as this, highlight to the need to pass such laws. In the 
US, the Department of Justice runs the Fair Housing Testing Program, which has resolved 105 cases since 
1992, imposing an average penalty of $130,000 for discriminatory housing practices (US DOJ, 2016). 
These sanctions, to the extent that landlords are aware of them, certainly aid in the fight against 
discriminatory housing practices, and provide a potential roadmap for other countries in the fight against 
housing discrimination.  
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